Hormuz Bypass Capacity vs. Hormuz Flows: 2026 Benchmark

Saudi Arabia and the UAE can bypass the Strait of Hormuz for roughly 6.5 million barrels per day of nominal crude capacity—but that is only about 31% of the 20.9 million barrels per day that moved through Hormuz in the first half of 2025. The practical share would be lower once storage, terminal access, tanker loading, crude grades and security are factored in.

Key Takeaways

• The capacity gap is large: Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline offer approximately 5.0 mb/d and 1.5 mb/d, respectively, versus roughly 20.9 mb/d of benchmark Hormuz oil flows.
• A bypass is a network, not a pipe: Oil must move through available storage, export berths, tankers, insurance markets and compatible destination refineries before it becomes a delivered barrel.
• LNG has no equivalent workaround: Pipelines can reroute crude, but they cannot replace LNG carriers, liquefaction plants or maritime export terminals during a Hormuz closure.

The Hormuz bypass capacity gap

The Strait of Hormuz is often described as a single chokepoint, but its importance is better understood as a network problem. Gulf producers rely on a dense system of offshore loading terminals, pipelines, tank farms, refineries and tanker routes. Disrupt one maritime corridor and the question is not simply whether oil still exists underground. The question is how much can reach a buyer, at what speed, cost and risk.

The baseline is enormous. EIA estimates cited for 2025 put oil and petroleum-liquids traffic through Hormuz at about 20.9 mb/d in the first half of the year and approximately 21.6 mb/d in the fourth quarter. During the major disruption benchmark in the second quarter of 2026, flows fell to about 4.9 mb/d.

That is not a small routing inconvenience. It is a loss of roughly 16 mb/d against the first-half 2025 benchmark.

A simple comparison gives the headline answer:

Nominal bypass coverage = 6.5 mb/d ÷ 20.9 mb/d ≈ 31%.

That figure is useful, but it should not be mistaken for an emergency forecast. The Saudi and UAE systems do not automatically serve every barrel that normally passes through Hormuz. Ownership, pipeline connections, crude quality, export destinations and terminal access all matter.

A Saudi pipeline cannot carry Kuwaiti, Qatari or Iranian barrels simply because it has theoretical spare room. Nor can a Fujairah loading slot necessarily replace an eastern Gulf cargo destined for a refinery configured for a different crude blend.

What the two main bypasses can actually do

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, widely known as Petroline, runs from the kingdom’s eastern production areas toward Yanbu on the Red Sea. Its strategic value is geographic: it gives Saudi crude access to a coast that does not require a tanker to pass through Hormuz.

Yanbu can serve customers in the Mediterranean, Europe and, with longer voyages, Atlantic markets. That makes the route a genuine alternative rather than a theoretical line on a map.

The catch is utilization. A pipeline rated at approximately 5 mb/d does not mean 5 mb/d of additional export capacity is available tomorrow morning. The effective figure depends on:

• Current throughput and maintenance status
• Crude segregation and blending requirements
• Storage at both ends
• Yanbu berth availability
• Tanker scheduling
• Domestic refinery demand
• Buyer acceptance of the redirected grades

The pipeline can reduce Saudi Arabia’s exposure to Hormuz. It cannot replace all Saudi maritime exports, and it cannot absorb the region’s displaced barrels.

The UAE’s Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline

The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, or ADCOP, moves crude from Abu Dhabi’s inland production areas to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Its approximately 1.5 mb/d nameplate capacity allows tankers to load outside the Strait of Hormuz.

Fujairah’s advantage is immediate and physical. A ship loading there can proceed into the Arabian Sea without entering the Persian Gulf chokepoint. The port also has extensive oil-storage infrastructure and is a major regional bunkering and maritime-services centre.

Still, “outside Hormuz” does not mean “outside risk.” Fujairah remains exposed to:

• Gulf of Oman security incidents
• Mines, missiles and drone attacks
• Port disruption
• War-risk insurance repricing
• Tanker availability and berth queues
• Pipeline or terminal outages

The UAE route is best understood as a second maritime access point, not a risk-free replacement for Hormuz.

Other alternatives

Iraq’s northern export routes toward Türkiye, Oman’s Arabian Sea ports and longer maritime diversions can help at the margin. None offers a rapid substitute for the full Gulf export system.

The Cape of Good Hope is often mentioned as an alternative route, but it solves a different problem. It can lengthen the voyage for tankers already outside the Gulf; it cannot help a cargo that cannot safely leave a terminal inside the affected zone.

Strategic petroleum reserves also buy time rather than create infrastructure. They may smooth a short disruption, but they do not provide pipeline capacity, tanker berths or LNG cargoes.

Why pipelines cannot fully replace Hormuz

The most important distinction is between nameplate capacity and deliverable crisis capacity.

A practical estimate can be expressed as:

Usable bypass capacity = nameplate capacity × operating availability × terminal factor × security factor × grade compatibility

Each factor can reduce the headline number.

A route may be rated for 5 mb/d but operate below that because of maintenance or crude-segregation constraints. The receiving terminal may lack enough tanks or loading windows. Tankers may avoid the port because war-risk premiums have become uneconomic. A refinery in Asia may not accept the available grade without changing its blend.

This is why a seven-day question is more useful than an annual capacity question:

How many additional barrels can reach a paying customer within the next week?

That answer may be far below 6.5 mb/d.

The market impact can therefore remain severe even when some barrels continue moving. Rerouted cargoes may preserve physical supply while causing higher freight rates, wider crude differentials, longer delivery times and aggressive inventory hoarding.

A bypass reduces exposure to one chokepoint. It does not preserve the old logistics system.

Oil and LNG are different problems

The LNG case is harsher. Hormuz carried approximately 10.5 billion cubic feet per day of LNG-related flows in the fourth quarter of 2025, according to the benchmark figures, but that fell to roughly 0.8 Bcf/d in the second quarter of 2026 during the disruption period.

Crude can sometimes travel through a pipeline to a different coast. LNG cannot move through an oil pipeline. Replacing a lost LNG cargo requires:

1. Available gas production
2. Liquefaction capacity
3. A functioning export terminal
4. Specialized LNG carriers
5. A secure maritime route
6. Import-terminal and regasification capacity

That chain has little short-term flexibility. Buyers may draw down storage, reduce industrial demand, switch fuels or compete for cargoes from the United States, Australia, Africa or elsewhere. None of those actions restores the lost Gulf LNG route quickly.

For energy planners, oil and LNG should never be placed in the same “bypass capacity” column. The infrastructure and substitution logic are fundamentally different.

How to measure real bypass capacity

A credible assessment should combine infrastructure data with observations of actual vessel and terminal activity.

AIS data can show tanker entries, departures, anchorage queues, destination changes and port calls at Yanbu and Fujairah. Commercial platforms such as Kpler, Vortexa, Spire Maritime and MarineTraffic can add cargo estimates and chartering information. AIS is not definitive: ships can disable transponders, transmit misleading destinations or disappear during sensitive operations.

Synthetic-aperture radar, including Sentinel-1 imagery, helps detect tankers in darkness and cloud cover. It is especially useful for spotting queues or anchored vessels during AIS gaps. Optical imagery from Sentinel-2, Landsat and commercial providers can add evidence about berth occupancy, tank-farm activity and construction.

Trade records provide a third check. EIA estimates, JODI statistics, UN Comtrade data, port authority releases and customs records can test whether observed vessel movements correspond to actual export volumes.

A useful evidence chain is:

1. Confirm stated pipeline and terminal capacity.
2. Check current utilization and maintenance.
3. Observe tanker movements with AIS and satellite data.
4. Measure storage and berth availability.
5. Test crude-grade and destination compatibility.
6. Apply insurance and security discounts.

That process separates immediate capacity, activatable capacity, theoretical capacity and non-substitute capacity.

For investors and policymakers, the decision rule is straightforward: treat a bypass as reliable only when the pipe, tank farm, berth, tanker and buyer can all operate together. A route that becomes useful after 30 days does not protect a market facing a 72-hour shock.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Can Saudi Arabia bypass the Strait of Hormuz?

Yes, partly. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline can move crude from eastern production areas to Yanbu on the Red Sea, with commonly cited nameplate capacity of about 5 mb/d. That capacity is much smaller than total Hormuz flows and may be reduced by storage, terminal, maintenance, grade and tanker constraints.

Q: How much oil can avoid the Strait of Hormuz?

Saudi and UAE pipelines provide approximately 6.5 mb/d of combined nominal capacity: about 5.0 mb/d through Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and 1.5 mb/d through the UAE’s ADCOP to Fujairah. Against a 20.9 mb/d Hormuz benchmark, that equals roughly 31% before crisis discounts.

Q: Can Fujairah replace Strait of Hormuz exports?

No. Fujairah can keep some Abu Dhabi crude moving without using the strait, but its pipeline and terminal system cannot replace regional Hormuz exports. It also remains exposed to Gulf of Oman security, tanker insurance and port-capacity constraints.

Q: What happens to LNG if Hormuz closes?

LNG faces a weaker bypass option than crude oil. Pipelines cannot substitute for LNG shipping, so buyers must rely on storage, demand reduction and replacement cargoes from other exporting countries—often at much higher freight and spot-market prices.